FORMATS 2
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Informative Non-compliance and Audiovisual Communication

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Communication is not just encoding and packaging thoughts and ideas and then sending them to the recipient for decoding and recovery of the thoughts and ideas that were previously in the mind of the sender. There is not necessarily a biunique relationship between the semantic representations of utterances and the specific interpretations of those utterances; rather, to the extent that this relationship is subjected to interpretation by the recipient, this relationship is usually plural.

All receipt of messages is subject to an interpretative structuring that operates simultaneously on two planes (1):

A) As direct observation "of" reality, where the message is interpreted according to the parameters of sensorial or observational experience aimed at objects and perceivable states. Since it is subject to specific rules of perception, this initial level of interpretation allows evaluation of the utterance from the perspective of the individual's personal experience. The recipient of the message, based on perceived referents, tries to make sense of the message, which becomes understood and believable. This type of interpretation is conditioned by the existence of a conventional code on various levels, from a biunique, closed system (i.e., traffic signals) to the comprehension of styles of narrative genre in which the possible relationships are substantially greater.

It is our personal, day-to-day knowledge about a part of reality that, in the case of communication, we might define as pretheoretical, intuitive knowledge about images by means of simple analogy with the real world. In this plane closest to us, images do not act like substitute signs but rather like "the object itself."

B) This knowledge of reality is both the reason behind and the motivation for a second interpretative plane as a manifestation "about" reality. In the act of producing messages we must also consider another type of unconventional communicative process and which, according to Sperber and Wilson, consists of using a stimulus that captures the attention of the receiver about a specific point and with the clear intention to transmit the non-conventionally coded content the speaker wishes to communicate to the hearer and make it understood to him or her.

This is the plane of communicative comprehension, in which the audiovisual message refers to the plane of social objects as semantic fields determined by how they have been

used in society. This plane goes back to the generation of symbolic products which say something about reality.

It is categorial knowledge aimed at the sense of the message, which the receiver tries to understand from his or her intersubjective relationship with other individuals by using his or her own communicative competence.

Once on this second plane, we will try to analyze the basic procedure for "unsaid" information, i.e., that which is shaped by indications the sender wants to transmit, albeit not explicitly, but under the belief that the receiver will try to recover. With this objective, the sender and receiver each initiate an exchange process in order to assign meaning to the elements sent.

In this view we start from the premise that the properties that are pertinent to an object, even those that might be considered most objective, are tributary to the cognitive abilities of human beings and are tied to the way in which they are perceived by humans in function of their communicative competence. This acquisition of meaning, then, occurs in two different places, one which is that of the sender, and the other, that of the receiver, and communication is achieved only when the senses both parties assign to the object are more or less equivalent, even though they never coincide entirely.

Senders do not limit themselves to providing pretheoretical, intuitive information about reality where the images would be mere substitutes for reality; rather, and here we refer to the plane of social objects, they also attempt to manifest themselves about this reality. In order to provide this information, they turn to knowledge of categories so that the recipient can understand things that do not directly correspond to the message sent.

Recipients, on the other hand, from their natural assumption of credibility, are led to interpret the message as a true description of reality, except in those cases in which they believe that the lack of regularity and adequacy of available meanings requires a different interpretation. In these cases hearers comprehend that the message has to be located beyond the first, conventional level of comprehension and must identify an alternative meaning that is consonant with the communicative purpose of the sender.

The inferential process

When a single, objective understanding of the message is not ensured because of ambiguity, then the hearer resorts to the context, and through an inferential process of exchanges and assumptions tries to rebalance and complement the utterance. Herein lies the interest in an analysis of the process an audiovisual message deemed "incomplete" is able to activate the inferential mechanisms that will allow its informative rebalance.

This process will take place is the following co-occur:

1. Non-compliance of norms: The message must show a perceptible modification of the usually accepted norms or rules for an informative act and the assurance that the sender is

not following them.

2. There are reasons for non-compliance: It must be clear that this modification, or lack of respect for the rules, has been done on purpose by the speaker and is recognized as such in the hearer's mind. The hearer has to believe that there are reasons behind the speaker's actions and the speaker, despite this irregularity, provides proof of his or her intention to cooperate in the act of communication.

3. An agreement to cooperate: In order to maintain this belief, the receiver assumes that the sender implicitly wants to say something other than what has been said. The sender must assume that the receiver is able to imagine that this assumption is necessary.

4. Beginning of the inferential process: With all these points in mind, and in order to arrive at the meaning implied, the receiver starts the corresponding inferential process.

1. Non-compliance of norms

When they begin a communicative act participants start a collective activity in which each party must be able to count on the other if the proposed act is to occur. In other words, to attain the proposed end, the sender must abide by some rules or maxims. These maxims, defined by Grice on the basis of Kant's categories of quantity, quality, relation, and manner, are the basis of the cooperative principle and are formalized in the following categories: Strict Informativeness (quantity), "Sincerity" (quality), "Relevance" (relation) and "Be perspicuous" (manner). Each of these categories groups together maxims or rules that the participants in a communicative act must accept and abide by in order to achieve ideal, successful, and theoretically optimal communication.

Grice relates the category of Strict Informativeness to that of the quantity of information that must be given and, in this sense, must be contributed by providing as much information as the communicative purpose requires. In principle information cannot be given to someone who already knows the information, especially if, as Ducrot states, it is our duty to know that the person knows it. It would also be a violation of strict informativeness if we provided more information than necessary. The sender, in order to draw attention to the communicative act, must indicate at the chosen point the precise length of the facts expounded.

The category of sincerity refers to the quality of the information, and in this sense the sender must try to ensure that his or her utterance is true, or he or she must believe it is true and must have sufficient proof thereof. In Ducrot's view, what is important is that we believe it is true. If we consider that we are interested in visual communication, we must point out that this principle is only valid when the receiver believes that the messages refer to reality. Normally this principle is equivalent to an agreement of trust by which the hearer believes the observations addressed to him or her have a basis.

The category of relevance forces us to say things that are pertinent, i.e., refer to what is supposed to be related to what is said. For example, it would not be very useful to use the photograph below to illustrate an article about the lifting of Pinochet's immunity, since the

sender provides no additional information to the receiver with this message. In fact, he or she says nothing relevant to the topic with it.



1. Taken from an advertisement for insurance.

Finally, the category of manner is related to how things are said, as opposed to what is said: say them clearly by avoiding obscure, ambiguous expression. This principle leads us to be brief and organized in our audiovisual messages (2).

As we have said, respect for these maxims is in principle a necessary condition for attaining successful communication. Nevertheless, one of the paradoxes of the communicative process is that although it is based on the application and respect for all these categories and principles, its purposeful disobedience does not make the message impossible to believe, rather, it leads to unexpressed senses that are basic to communicative reality. Nonetheless, we need to bear in mind that "excessive" non-compliance of the maxims can lead to a situation in which communication breaks down and the communicative act fails.

In discourse it is rarely the case that all the information needed by the receiver is present. What is always provided is what the sender deems necessary, in accordance with the circumstances and possibilities of the particular time. As Jean-Michel Besnier (1991) stated, communication forces us to interpret and make inferences that defy coding. In the first place, the hearer infers that the speaker has said "what was said to him" (which he has wanted to express in the sense of the words and images he or she has sent) and afterwards, the receiver takes the context into account in order to determine what speech act he or she is dealing with. When it is discovered that the act apparently violates a conversational maxim, he or she infers that a second act indirectly is occurring, so that in the end the speaker has said "what he said."

Apparent violation of maxims occurs when, after having identified each one of the elements of a text and recognized their direct sense, the receiver does not extract an overall sense allowing him or her to understand the message's intent, whether that be due to the

fact that the initial meanings are not useful for the meaning perceived by the reader, or whether it be because the possible meanings enter into conflict and do not allow a selective process to begin, or simply because there is an incomplete space in the meanings available.

2. Nando, *El País*, 26/X/98.

As can be seen in this example, the "initial" meanings of picture 2 do not correspond to the author's real communicative intention; i.e. the sender is not trying to tell us that a lot of hands are coming out of a box. As a result, the conflicts generated by the message are interpreted as intended and denote a desire to suggest meanings beyond those of the message itself, which in this case are related to the cease fire by ETA a few months prior to the Basque elections.

2. There are reasons for non-compliance

When there is an infraction, the hearer's initial reaction is not to accuse the hearer of breaking the rules but rather to assume that even if there is a "formal" infraction, the meaning conveyed has been respected. In these cases there is an implied sense that is none other than that which must be added to reestablish the equilibrium in the set of maxims. If an utterance is redundant or trite, but nevertheless the speaker provides proof that he or she is abiding by the other maxims, the hearer's first interpretation does not consider it not very relevant or suitable information-wise because it violates the category of relevance, but rather considers it imbalanced and thus the implication is a different meaning must be assigned in order to reestablish informative precision. If we turn to picture 1 of this article, the receiver would have to think that the sender is guilty of formally violating a maxim in order to communicate an implied sense that in this case might be, for instance, the inability to illustrate the information with a more explanatory image.

Searle believes that implicatures might arise from relating apparent violations of a maxim to the assumption that, despite the violations, the sender wants to continue with the communicative act. Despite the irregularity in communication, the receiver recognizes the desire to cooperate in those situations in which it occurs, and interprets that the speaker has sufficient reasons to not provide all the information required and will thus attempt to uncover those reasons in order to correctly interpret the message.

The effort entailed in accomplishing a speech act in itself indicates the speaker's wish to produce a contextual effect, and the belief that the effort required by this purpose is no greater than necessary. The hearer understands that the speakers wants to communicate something and assumes that the effort invested to achieve this effect has been evaluated by the speaker and if this has occurred, it is because doing so was worth it, since the effort was no greater than that which was necessary to achieve the desired contextual effects.

According to Sperber and Wilson, this effort can be measured in terms similar to those used to measure productivity, i.e., by determining "costs" and "benefits." The contextual effect or inference will be related to the effort that must be expended to achieve this effect and consequently an assumption will be relevant in a given context to the extent that the contextual effects are broad and the effort required to obtain it is small. The hearer can thus assume that the effort expended by the speaker was worthwhile and thus the effects might be of interest to the hearer. As a result, efficient communication is that in which the speaker is able to bring forth the greatest number of contextual effects with the minimum effort in information processing.

The ability of a speaker to insinuate or suggest something must be equivalent to the ability of the hearer to receive the implicit information that the hearer does not want to explicitly state. This ability to understand what is "implied" allows us to infer the implicatures desired by the speaker from the information that he or she has provided, and it will be successfully recovered if the choice of assumption and the conclusions made by the hearer are a reflection of the hypothesis the speaker had made about the prior knowledge and resources available to the hearer.

Obviously, the speaker can overestimate the hearer and believe him able to supply an assumption that is, in fact, unknown to him. In this case the communicative act will fail. It will also fail in the opposite case, when the speaker mistakenly does not take into account the knowledge possessed by the hearer. The hearer is responsible for the success and truth of his discourse, in the sense that he must first determine if the hearer is able to recover certain assumptions about his discourse and interpret them in a way that is optimally coherent with the principle of pertinence.

The degree of intensity with which transgression of a maxim is expressed, although it may not directly affect the validity of the implicature, always transmits added meanings that the hearer should take into account. "Quiet" non-compliance, with no ostentation, leads one to interpret the transgression as apparent or minimal, and allows the hearer to believe or simulate that the speaker is abiding by all the maxims and transforms the implicature as an object of a "secret complicity" by reinforcing the cooperative principle. On the other hand,

open, explicit and clear non-compliance of one of the maxims admits no mistake nor apparent acceptance of direct discourse, thereby eliminating the possibility of secret complicity.

We can nonetheless not ignore that non-compliance of maxims can lead in extreme situations to breaking of communicative ties. For example, if I give less information than necessary, and in addition I clearly falsify the remaining information, the communicative ties become disconnected and any possible implicatures generated by this act will be foreign to the information requested.

"Uncontrolled" non-compliance with maxims by the speaker can produce effects different from those desired and they may vary with the maxim or maxims violated. Breaking the maxim of good form or manner of brevity is not the same as violating the maxim of strict informativeness or truth quality. In the former case, the hearer is more disposed to look for the reasons justifying violation and will try to uncover the implicatures derived therefrom, whereas in the latter case there is easily a breakdown in the communicative process. For example, if I provide less information than asked of me I am breaking the maxim of strict informativeness (quantity) but this infraction may imply following the maxim of sincerity (do not say what you believe to be false or do not have sufficient proof thereof).

3. An agreement to cooperate

Normally all acts of communication automatically convey an assumption of cooperation. The hearer understands that the speaker, despite the emission of his or her incomplete or defective audiovisual message, keeps on abiding by the cooperative principle and this is tacitly and gratefully accepted by all the participants in the act of communication. He or she also allows this participation to conform to what the situation requires and to the purpose or aim accepted by the participants (3).

The hearer expresses the desire to cooperate by drawing attention to violation of one of the maxims related to abiding by all the others, and the hearer, when he has proof of the violation, accepts it and assumes it has occurred so that another maxim believed to be more important can be upheld. This effort in discourse is understood as proof of the speaker's desire to cooperate.

From this standpoint communication can be considered a contractural activity based on participants' efforts to cooperate. Speaker and hearer have to make an effort to communicate that at each moment must be that required by the purpose and situation the message is involved in. This effort to cooperate requires each participant to recognize the other according to the principle of reciprocity as being effective, and assumes that any communicative exchange may involve possibilities which each participant can try to dominate in order to influence the other. With this objective in mind, participants negotiate various strategies (4).

As a result, the cooperative principle is a preparatory condition that participants must observe so that messages can be properly interpreted. If this were not the case, an audiovisual message would be judged inappropriate and would become an unconnected,

absurd sum of mistaken identities.

We shall therefore start from the fact that beginning a communicative exchange requires the participants to agree upon a series of phenomena implying that the message act is trying to express something more than the immediate sense of the message itself (5).

4. The beginning of the inferential process

Like all human activity, communicative acts can be explained by a set of purposeful acts. Behind each communicative act one assumes the existence of an intention that becomes essential when inferring the meaning. Effecting an act without its purpose in mind makes no sense at all. Consequently, an action deemed to be intentional is a communicative act entailing the assumption of cooperation. It invites the hearer to make the effort to process the information necessary to obtain the proper interpretation.

Meaning and communication for Grice are based on the recognition on the part of the hearer of the informative purpose underlying the utterance. The speaker, in pointing out some facts with the intention to communicate something specific, informs the hearer that by expounding those facts he or she is attempting to communicate something else that is beyond what is explicitly stated. The hearer understands that the message is for him or her, and the speaker attempts to communicate what determining factors allow the hearer to infer the "predetermined" implicatures in the text, which the speaker has calculated and evaluated in the hopes that the hearer recovers them and arrives at the expected conclusions and not at others (6).

3. José Luis Martín, *El Periódico de Catalunya*, January, 1998.

Showing the image of Che with a papal miter constitutes a proper communicative act if the receiver-participant is competent and able to infer that the stimulus presented is purposefully shown and is able to determine the meaning the sender-participant intended to transmit by showing it (7).

The construction of context

Interpreting the correct identification of the intention existing in the utterance and assigning meaning in the terms the speaker is trying to transmit forces the hearer when he or she receives the message to try to get beyond the first stage of "disconcertment" and try to disambiguate the utterance. The first goal of this operation is to detect in the message the important elements suggested and construct an adequate context about which believable assumptions can be made.

In this initial phase of the process, the relevance of the elements expressed will depend on the way the hearer's expectations are modified. Thus, something will be relevant to the extent it is captured as a non-ordinary form and identified as a special structure.

From this point of view, visual stimuli only point to show reality with the goal of making the hearer contruct the inference necessary to allow him or her to elaborate and recover the communicative purpose. As Sperber and Wilson state, what's given is not the context but rather the presupposition that what has been said, or shown, is relevant. In other words, even though inferred thoughts have their origin in the visual stimuli shown, the stimuli are not their direct causes. The relevant elements of a message do nothing more than make certain thoughts or assumptions possible in the mind of the hearer and they shape the context from which inference takes place.

As a result, comprehension of a message that is deemed intentionally insufficient, to the extent it is trying "to say what it doesn't say," forces us to first analyze the relevant facts in conjunction with the context it creates. This deficiency can be seen from two different but complementary standpoints:

(a) by not expressing but implying a segment of a message; and

(b) by deleting a part of the thought and letting the competent hearer reestablish this intended gap.

(a) In the former case, the implicit sense goes beyond the simple identification and placement of referents. The hearer turns to the possible presupposed utterances in relation to the principles of narration that regulate the text itself and give it sense. The textual implicatures must be inserted into the text, even though they are not logically deducible properties of "what is said" but rather of "saying what is said" and therefore do not have any relationship with the logical values of the utterance. That is why these implicatures are defined by the interpretive situation generated by the text itself, outside of which they are no longer coherent.

What brings us to presuppose the referents is motivated by a network of competing delimited relations for "what is understood" that is made up of everything that can be "assumed" or "possible." We might say that textual implicature is a type of insinuation, or hypothesis, allowing one to "complete" the real content that the speaker intends to communicate through the utterance. It permits re-establishment of discourse classified as insufficient or irregular.

Initially stimulated by the information contributed by the utterance, the hearer processes a part of the message that, due to its informative value and reliability, he or she considers most relevant. Reliability is defined by the degree of certainty the speaker believes what it seems to be; thus, signs like houses in ruins, a shotgun, or a military uniform are predictable by the hearer to the extent that they can be associated with the conceptual contents "battle," "war," "desperation," etc., that are known by and judged to be reliable by the hearer. The remaining signs are simply rejected or reduced to predictable meanings as the processing continues.

4. Reuters, *El Heraldo de Aragón*, 1997.

(b) In the interpretation of messages characterized by the deletion of elements, the hearer goes beyond the text itself and turns to meanings that can be inferred from the message in the proper context. The correct interpretation of the fact suggested will depend upon the full competence of the hearer and on the interpretation generated. The inferences must be sought in the utterance and the opportunity of use in a context of intuitive suppositions and conclusions that the hearer, given his or her informal ability to reason, extracts from his or her overall communicative competence.

Thus, the inference process, from which new meanings beyond the strict meaning arise,

does not only depend on the message but also on the understanding of that which is implied within certain conditions of use in a context made up of a set of thoughts that are allowed or imagined to be true at a point in time and which are extracted from the total set of thoughts that an individual has in his or her representation of the real world, i.e. personal opinions, assumptions, beliefs, wishes, etc.

The hearer considers among all possible contexts the one that he or she judges to be the most suitable because he or she can relate the contextual effects to the speaker's objectives. The heuristics used do not necessarily derive from logical processes; the hearer establishes a set of hypotheses or assumptions that, within the limits imposed by memory,

attention span or the rules of deduction, brings the hearer "automatically" according to Sperber and Wilson (1987:701) to extract the pertinent implications in relation to the assumptions and information that are known and thought to be reasonable and not trivial. Inferring, then, is the process by which an assumption is accepted as true or probably true, depending on the strength of true or the probability of other presuppositions (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 68).

During the inferential process the hearer tries to recognize assumptions that can provide a coherent sense to the utterance. The hearer uses information from the most salient elements in the message and assigns them to competing spaces, placing in his or her memory some initial assumptions that satisfy the information and the deductive process begins.

Each assumption suggests other, new assumptions, and their combination gives rise to new synthetic inferences. The new inferred situation then combines with pre-existing assumptions to modify and improve the context, and from this confrontations contextual effects that reinforce previous assumptions are deduced.

For the hearer, recovery of implicatures is both a condition for and the motivation behind new inferences. Implicature is associated with new thoughts or assumptions in his or her overall communicative competence and looks for the assumptions leading to the most relevant interpretation possible in the new set of thoughts, i.e., the largest number of contextual effects possible. To the extent that interpretation progresses, successive interpretative actions are incorporated and the context changes. Each new utterance, even though it is fed by the same inferential capacity as previous utterances were, is placed in a different context. This is why context is both dynamic and variable; it is neither fixed nor given, but rather constructed by the hearer at all times.

Hierarchy of suppositions

All utterances are normally full of ambiguities and cases of referential ambivalence that arise from violation of the maxims, and can thus be understood in many different ways. The main difficulty does not come from the diversity of possible interpretations but rather from choosing the assumptions that meet the author's intent the best. In other words, the issue is separating them from the rest of possible assumptions.

To achieve this hierarchy and choice, humans, as communicatively competent beings, have previous knowledge of the representation of the world that they share with others. We also have schemata for cognitive storage that are able to attribute certain senses to perceived stimuli (8).

This communicative competence allows us to evaluate and establish hierarchies possible suppositions, as not all suppositions have the same relative importance nor are the all equally true. These differences stem from the relationship between utterances and the set of thoughts they cause, which are decisive when inferences are made (9).

Thus, those signs judged to be known are eliminated during the process, because the

suppositions that could generate these signs do not entail any modification of the current context and thus are lacking in inferential interest. For example, the utterance "this is a flower", with its redundancy, does not contribute any contextual modification.

5. Taken from an advertisement for shoes.

The information that does not allow interaction with previous information and thus makes inferring new information impossible is also deleted. This would be the case of the piece of information stating that it rained on May 5, 1881.

Information judged to be incoherent with respect to the context is also eliminated, since its elocutionary force is so weak it practically does not modify the context. For example, we could have, "Camila Parker has been chosen Miss United Kingdom."

6. *The Mirror*. Published in *El Periódico de Catalunya*, 27/XI/98.

In a second inferential stage the suppositions are organized into a hierarchy; the most believable or likely to be true are put before what is probable, and probable assumptions come before what is less probable. During the inferential process the assumptions considered true or most believable are chosen as opposed to those that are not. The strength of the inference depends on the how each supposition is classified.

During this process each supposition is accepted on the basis of the truth of another assumption, and an inferential process is deduced. When the assumptions that are the basis for an inference are true, the inference obtained is true. If only one of the suppositions is true, the value of the inference is less than the weakest of the assumptions. If there is a contradiction amongst the suppositions, then the most likely supposition is chosen. If there is no contradiction, and the possibilities of the suppositions are reasonably likely, we tend to choose those suppositions that are safest.

The strength of a supposition also depends on the relationship that the hearer establishes between it and the way it has been acquired. If it comes from the individual's own experience, it is stronger than if it has been transmitted by others. In the former case the supposition will be considered real because it is tied to the hearer's experience and memory. As a specific known case, the assumption becomes a precedent or model with which to evaluate other cases. In the other cases, where evaluation is based on knowledge acquired by other means or people, their strength is directly proportional to the credit given to the means or person that transmitted them.

One of the most outstanding peculiarities of implicature and successive inference is that

the continuation of discourse can unauthorize or cancel the inferences that had arisen from the same message. For example, in the following picture there receiver might infer that the Parliamentary Right and the Catholic Church have commitments to one another and unconfessable subordinations, as well as a reactionary, authoritarian attitude on the part of the Right and might even infer there is a traitor on the Left. In the face of this interpretation, the sender might state that that is not what he or she said, because, in fact, the final inference is the responsibility of the receiver.

7. Ventura & El Burladero. *La Vanguardia*, 23/IX/98.

The implicature allows one to "make a certain content understood" without assuming responsibility for communicating the propositional content really conveyed. Inferring meaning is a way of finding something out that the sender wants the receiver to know, but without taking responsibility for that communicative fact, to the extreme that the inference may be false but that does not mean the message is altered in its truth value or efficacy. The sender, since he or she is not necessarily responsible for the implicatures, can recover the text and deny the implicit meanings, whether by adding a clause to invalidate them or by referring the message to another context that clearly indicates that the receiver is flagrantly violating the cooperative principle.

Inferences, because they lie within the competence of hearers, make them and not the sender responsible for them. This dependence between inference and communicative competence of the hearer also allows for a generative knowledge of what has been said from that that is shown. Compared with the direct response of a codified act. inferential responses enrich the communicative act in that they complement information that was not explicit enough and broaden their meaning beyond that from the simple conclusion inferred.

This circumstance, which has traditionally been considered a deficiency of natural

language and thus improper of communication based on the biunique principles of logic, must be envisioned as enriching the communicative act in the sense that it increases the elocutionary force beyond the inferred conclusion. From comprehending the topic stated, the hearer is responsible for the inferred conclusion, and in suggesting other suppositions, increases and enriches the relevance of the initial statement. We might say, then, that hearers thus use inferential interpretation to become co-authors of discourse.

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Notes:

(1) Please see J. Pericot, "Les guies inicials i els llindars del joc visual", *Formats 1*. www.iua.upf.es/formats.

(2) Sperber and Wilson (1981) believe that Grice's maxims can be reduced to a single Principle of Relevance, that which is essential and sufficient to initial in human beings an inferential process in the course of communication. Although their proposal is coherent and understandable, the subdivision Jordi this principle into categories and maxims allows us to analyze the many uses which messages are subjected to in communicative acts more specifically. In particular, it allows us to specifically examine the modalities of use based on violation of the maxims.

(3) Grice, H. P. "Logic and Conversation, Syntax and Semantics" in P. Cole and J. Morgan, editors. *Speech Acts*, vol. 3. Orlando: Academic Press Harcourt Brace, 1975, pp.

41-45.

(4) For more information on the Principle of Influence, see Grice (1975:45).

(5) See Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté*. The Hague: Mouton, 1967, p. 70.

(6) See Sperber, D. and D. Wilson, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 153-4.

(7) Allowing the interpretative phenomenon of the hearer to infer the informative and communicative intention of the speaker has not gone without criticism. Wimsatt and Beardsley, with their theory of intentional fallacy (cf. W. K. Wimsatt & M. C. Beardsley, 1954, "The intentional fallacy" in *The Verbal Icon*, London: Methuen & Co.) questioned intentionality as the basis of meaning. Many analysts of communication have doubts about the possibility of accessing knowledge through utterances. For some of them, the meaning of an utterance is only that which the author has wanted to assign to it. The hearer, since he or she does not have access to the speaker's mind but rather only to what is said or shown, cannot know anything beyond that which the author said.

We recommend the following three works from this standpoint: J. K. Adams. *Pragmatics and Fiction*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1985; M. Toolan. "Largely for against theory". *Journal of Literary Semantics XIX (*1990: 150-66); and, K. Green "Relevance Theory and the literary text: some problems and perspectives". *Journal of Literary Semantics XXII* 3 (1995: 207-17).

Even while admitting that utterances can be interpreted differently, other authors such as J. Derrida ("Signature event context", *GLYPH* 1, 1977: 172-97) consider that the meaning of an utterance is only the meaning that it formally has and there is no way to extract another sense without limiting the functions of "readers." The message "is what it is" even though the meaning the speaker assigns to it might vary constantly. If we move the text away from its original meaning and recontextualize it, it loses its original intentional meaning. This fixed nature of the meaning of an utterance contrasts with the pragmatic option of the text. Basing ourselves on the influence of ideas of Thiebault and others (cf. C. Thiebault, "Retórica de la lucidez," in *La Balsa de la Medusa* 32 (1994: 61-80); Dixon, et al., "Literary processing and Interpretation: toward empirical foundations," in *Poetics* 32 (1.2) (1993: 5-33); Eco, U. *Los límites de la interpretación,* Barcelona: Lumen, 1992; von Blasersfeld (1983:208); Brudella, L. "The pragmatics of Literary Texts" in D. Stein (ed.) (1992: 313-33)), we believe that the meaning of a message is only the interpretation a reader assigns to it. The author, therefore, invites or encourages a certain interpretation which the hearer recovers.

As we said earlier, the present study, since it concentrates on messages that intentionally violate maxims in order to imply other meanings, believes that the author always takes into account the fact that implicatures arise from an interpretation in context, and therefore tries to induce the hearer/reader to a certain reading and specifically to that reading.

(8) Please see Belinchón, et al., *Psicología del lenguaje; investigación y teoría*. Madrid: Trotta, 1992.

(9) Please see Recanti, F., "Communication et Cognition". *Pragmalinguistica* 1 (1993): 281-305.