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Intuition and Intelligence: On Bergson in Eugeni d'Ors **Nelson R . Orringer**

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INTUITION AND INTELLIGENCE: ON BERGSON IN EUGENI D'ORS

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No penetrating study of Ors's thought can neglect his relationship with Bergson. For the fragmentary, discontinuous "gloses" ("glosas") in which Ors prefers to expose his ideas cannot be understood without comparison to the smooth-rolling intuitions of Bergson, to whom they respond. Ors's biographer Enric Jardí, not a comparatist, argues Ors's heavy indebtedness to Bergson,¹ while Ors's student José Luis L. Aranguren, though not denying the debt, regards Bergson as rather the negative stimulus needed by

¹ In *Eugenio d'Ors. Obra y vida*, Barcelona, 1967, 344, Jardí notes Bergson's presence in the structure of *La filosofía del hombre que trabaja y que juega*, with its contrast between Power and Resistance, Spirit and Nature. Moreover, Bergson also affected Ors's fiction (Jardí, 207-208). We should also note a brief allusion to Bergson in his 1907 article, from the *Glosari de Xenius*, written in Catalan and titled "Le Dantec and Science as a Standard" ("Le Dantec i la Ciència com a Mesura") in which he points out the decline of Positivism. Le Dantec, a Positivist philosopher, very famous then, is today remembered mostly through a single statement, "Sans phosphore, pas de pensée". Ors states, "The times — Bergson, a new Sun, is rising — are not favorable to Le Dantec". In Eugeni d'Ors, *Obra Catalana completa. Glosari 1906-1910*, Barcelona, Ed. Selecta, 1950, 626. The Catalan text reads, "L'hora — Bergson, sol nou, es lleva — no és favorable a Le Dantec". Also of interest is another comment in the same *Glosari* dated 1908 when Ors took part in the Heidelberg International Congress of Philosophy. He points out Bergson's absence, because of his ill health, he will be absent but sorely missed: "Ell serà, ja es veu, desd'ara, el rei de la festa... Tot Heidelberg va ple del seu nom" (809) ("He will be, obviously, the king of this meeting. All Heidelberg resounds with his name", *ibid.*, 809). Ors points out that German translations of Bergson's works are to be seen in the windows of all the bookstores. It is impossible, he states, to look in any direction without finding "*Henri Bergson — Materie und Gedächtnis ... Henri Bergson — Materie und Gedächtnis*" (*ibid.*, 309).

Ors to write his doctoral dissertation and to attain philosophical independence.² Ors himself confesses in print his ambivalence towards Bergson, felt even while studying with him at the Collège de France around 1909.³ Recently, though, Jaume Roura Roca has documented Ors's unlimited enthusiasm for Bergson as late as 1908. Ors's handwritten memorandum "La crítica i els mètodes de la ciència contemporània" contains a surprisingly lengthy, laudatory exposition of Bergson's epistemology. This unpublished manuscript mentions the *Essai sur les donnés immédiates de la conscience*, *Matière et mémoire*, even *L'Évolution créatrice*, which came out in 1907. Ors applauds Bergson for countering mechanistic positivism, based on the category of space, with his own anti-intellectualistic "temporalism". Moreover, he relates Bergson's mysticism to Carlyle's, influential on himself.⁴ How far does he really move beyond Bergson when he attains the new intellectualism of his maturity? The present study attempts to show through precise comparisons the presence of Bergson in Ors's conceptions of intuition and intelligence, two notions lying at the heart of his philosophy.

Long before meeting Bergson, Ors had come to believe that Catalonia had never experienced the Renaissance with the rest of

² On Ors's unpublished thesis *Las aporías de Zenón de Elea y la noción moderna del Espacio-Tiempo* (1914), see J.L.L. Aranguren, *La filosofía de Eugenio d'Ors*, Madrid, 1981, 251.

³ *U-turn-it* (1921), in *Nuevo glosario*, I (MCMXX-MCMXXVI), Madrid, 1947, 462. Henceforth all references from the *Nuevo glosario* appear parenthesized in our text with date of essay cited, abbreviation NG, volume in Roman numerals, and page in Arabic numbers. References from the *Novísimo glosario* (MCMXXXIV-MCMXXXV) Madrid, 1946, are parenthesized with date of essay, abbreviation NOG, and page number.

⁴ J. Roura Roca, "La etapa barcelonesa de Eugenio d'Ors", in *Actas del III Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía Española*, ed. A. Heredia Soriano, Salamanca, 1983, 357.

Europe. Roura Roca thus explains Ors's resolve, expressed in 1909, to fill the cultural and scientific void by importing to Barcelona what he called "scientism", the European movement which, as against positivism, encouraged the convergence of philosophy and science (361). Hence the uneasiness which tempered Ors's admiration of Bergson and which prompted him to draw from his teacher certain aspects of intellectualism criticized by Bergson. To view reality with Bergson as unpredictable, like the flux of time, seemed tantamount to Ors to denying every cultural norm and to admitting the victory of spontaneity (1921, *NG*, I, 462). On the other hand, this vehement reaction against Bergson masked a secret attraction to his thinking. Ors came to view his own intellectualism as the mast of Ulysses' ship to which he had himself bound to resist the sirens' song (1944, *NOG*, 348). In Bergson's "music" Ors perceived the sinuosity of the Oriental flute with its "venomous charm", antagonistic to the "stern lyre" of rationalistic classicism. At sessions of the Société Française de Philosophie, Ors noted a campaign afoot to restore the intellectualistic tradition handed down to the West by Pythagoras (theorist of musical intervals on the lyre). The restoration would undo the subtle plot of *fin de siècle* France against intelligence. The new intellectualists, however, thought it counterproductive to repeat rationalistic commonplaces so effectively refuted by Bergson in the negative portion of his philosophy (1947, *NG*, III, 806). Accordingly, Ors decided that in the philosophical tradition extending from Descartes to Bergson, he would have to move back toward Descartes. "We are returning from romantic intuitionism to classical intellectualism, although the intellectualism to which we aspire may need to be broadened and enriched with the booty of conquest in the earlier adventure" (1925, *NG*, I, 1026).⁵ Seeing himself so en-

⁵ "Estamos regresando del intuitivismo romántico al clásico intelectua-

riched by Bergson's philosophy, Ors should not be taken too literally when labeling Bergson a romantic "obscurantist", favoring the unconscious over consciousness, the biological over the logical, life over reason (1923, *NG*, I, 634-5). Bergson often employs ideas garnered from the intellectualistic tradition and borrowed as he formulates them by Ors. Both Bergson and Ors combine intuition and dialectics in their essays. Both hold up human wholeness as the goal of philosophy. Between them seems to exist merely a difference in degree, with intuition predominant in Bergson and dialectics in Ors. To perceive this relationship between them, we need only compare what Bergson means by intuition with what Ors conceives as intelligence.

Intuition, according to Bergson's *Matière et mémoire*, denotes the basic property of pure, essential perception, the quality of establishing immediate contact with the object, allowing penetration into it, and the vision of it as a continuum, a becoming. The subject, through an effort of sympathy, transfers himself to the inside of the object and intuits it in flux.⁶ Analytical thinking, on the other hand, leads the object to the subject, seeking to make use of its image. This form of cognition, which Bergson usually calls intelligence, is the instrument of *Homo faber*, material and moral maker of things and of himself.⁷ In Bergson, despite expressions seeming to favor intuition over intelligence, both types of knowledge complement one another. To obtain an intuition of reality, a spiritual sympathy with its intimacy, the author of *La Pensée et le mouvant* thinks it necessary to learn about the real beforehand

lismo, aunque el intelectualismo a que aspiramos haya de ser ya ampliado y enriquecido con el botín de lo conquistado en la aventura anterior".

⁶ Jean Theau, *La Critique bergsonienne du concept*, Toulouse, 1968, 136, 143.

⁷ Henri Bergson, *La Pensée et le mouvant*, in *Oeuvres*, ed. André Robinet, Paris, 1970, 1325. Henceforth all references from Bergson, except for the one in n. 11, infra, come from this edition and appear parenthesized in our text.

through a series of practical contacts with its surface aspects (Theau, 147). In the debate between realism and idealism, Bergson prefers the means between the two extremes. Guided by his "sens commun", he remarks in the preface to *Matière et mémoire* that matter consists for him of a collection of images; and that images, as he understands them, have an existence half-way between what realists call "things" and idealists "représentations" (161).

Let us now compare Ors's conceptions of intuition and intelligence. In *La filosofía del hombre que trabaja y que juega*, his notion of intuition precisely coincides with Bergson's. For the Catalan philosopher, intuition is "the faculty of perceiving ... solely the individual concrete".⁸ Here Ors echoes *L'Évolution créatrice*, where Bergson sees intuition and intelligence as two "faculties" needed in every epistemology (646), and where he compares intuition to the vision of the artist, trying to capture the individual's innermost being through sympathy (645). In this essay, though, Bergson marvels at the potential of intuition for allowing sympathetic communication between the subject and all living beings. Intuition dilates the consciousness, immerses it in the river of endless creativity, of life itself (646). If an individual, with his consciousness so dilated, discovers a new truth, he has what Bergson calls an original intuition ("intuition originelle"). This notion has affected Ors so deeply, that out of it emerges his own new intellectualism. In short, Bergson's intuitionism has unexpectedly provided an effective arm to the enemy camp!⁹

⁸ "...la facultad de percibir ... únicamente lo concreto individual" (*La filosofía del hombre que trabaja y que juega. Antología filosófica de Eugenio d'Ors*, ed. R. Rubcabo y J. Farrán, Barcelona, n. d., 121). Hereafter references from this work appear parenthesized in our text with abbreviation *FHTJ* and page number.

⁹ Diego Ruiz notes that in a private conversation in Paris, Bergson told Ors that his own anti-intellectualism was irreconcilable with Ors's neo-intellectualism; that Bergson felt himself in possession of the truth; but that Eastern peoples,

In the lecture "L'Intuition philosophique" delivered in Bologna in 1911, Bergson explains "original intuition" and applies it to Berkeley, whom Ors admires as the first modern idealist (1944, *NOG*, 253). In every philosophical system, amid the many doctrines borrowed from others, lies an original insight. Unable to define it with precision, Bergson recommends intuiting it, assuming the mental attitude of the philosopher who had it, trying to see what he saw. The original intuition, though implying a denial of received ideas, can only be articulated in pre-existing concepts. Bergson offers the example of Berkeley's new theory of vision: whereas Descartes and Locke, in physical cognition, insist on the distinction between objective qualities (figure, motion, shape) and subjective qualities (color, odor, sound), Berkeley holds that both types of qualities, inseparable from one another, lie in the mind. *Esse est percipi*. This original intuition, Bergson thinks, affects the rest of Berkeley's thought, otherwise traceable to different philosophers. Hence, in the light of the notion that all physical knowledge is subjective, how can we understand Berkeley's idealism? When Berkeley argues that matter is nothing but a collection of ideas, according to Bergson, he is saying that

matter is coextensive to our representation; that it has no inside, no underside; that it conceals nothing, contains nothing; that it possesses neither powers nor hidden virtues of any kind; that it is displayed on a surface, and that it holds everything, at every instant, in what it presents. The word "idea" normally denotes an existence of that kind, ... a completely actualized existence whose being is only the same as its appearance, while the word "thing" lets us think of a reality which would also be a storehouse of possibilities.¹⁰

whose metaphysical tradition his own theses continued, always fared poorly in the struggle with the West, whose world-view Ors was continuing (*FHTJ*, 164).

¹⁰ "...[que] la matière est coextensive à notre représentation; qu'elle n'a pas

Berkeley, as a result, prefers to call material bodies “ideas” rather than “things”. Matter, seen as nothing but “ideas”, contains nothing within itself. No general idea, no abstraction can be drawn out of it. Bergson goes further, showing how Berkeley’s original intuition influences his thinking on man and God. Matter, made of ideas, requires an intelligent Cause, a Prime Mover. God, Who undoubtedly exists, leaves the imprint of the “ideas” in each man, an unquestionably existing will, creaselessly limited by Divine Will (1346-55).

Keeping in mind Bergson’s idea of “original intuition” with his example of Berkeley, we shall see how idea and example form part of Ors’s philosophy. He subscribes to the theory of “original intuition”. As against scholars who question the originality of Bernat Metge, Ors discovers his “fundamental, seminal, intuition, the posture, the stress”,¹¹ in his unique combination of piety and irony, his agility in the pro and contra of dialogue, the playful impression he gives of half-adherence to ideas (*FHT*), 88-89). Ors’s most explicit application of Bergson’s concepts concerns “Azorín”:

Bergson said one day to philosophers meeting in Bologna that every philosopher’s doctrine could be reduced, insofar as it held anything personal and original, to a parent intuition, and that the latter could be revealed in a few words, in one word alone. Let my friends take up the chore that Bergson has set for them: what an illuminating chore they will find it! The structure of “Azorín”’s thought can be wholly sketched around a singular center, which can probably be summed

d’intérieur, pas de dessous; qu’elle ne cache rien, ne renferme rien; qu’elle ne possède ni puissances ni virtualités d’aucune espèce; qu’elle est étalée en surface et qu’elle tient tout entière, à tout instant, dans ce qu’elle donne. Le mot «idée» désigne d’ordinaire une existence de ce genre, ... une existence complètement réalisée, dont l’être ne fait qu’un avec le paraître, tandis le mot «chose» nous fait penser à une réalité qui serait en même temps un réservoir de possibilités”.

¹¹ “...intuición fundamental y matriz, la posición, el acento”.

up as its characteristic intuition of *sensitivity*, in its emphasis on the high value of this (1921, *NG*, I, 545-46).¹²

In both applications of Bergson's notion of original intuition, Ors stresses less than the French vitalist the system of ideas elucidated by the intuition, and prefers to note its esthetic and practical implications.

Considerations of beauty and utility mark the "original intuition" of Ors's own philosophy, "figurative thinking". Aranguren sees this invention as Ors's attempt to supersede the opposition between intellectualism and intuitionism (84). In fact, Ors seems to be synthesizing Bergson's mental style with the intellectualist Berkeley's as described by Bergson. "Figurative thinking" signifies a mode of cognition aspiring to capture the direct expression and pure vision of the object at once, an expression and vision irreplaceable by any other.¹³ This means "thinking with the eyes" or aiming for a concrete generalization.¹⁴ Perception of this living idea is what Ors terms *Seny*. Instead of limiting this Catalan word to its usual connotation of "common sense", "savvy", he expands its meaning to embrace that of French *sagesse* and even more (*FHTJ*, 120-21). For Bergson, *sagesse* means efficacy in practical matters.

¹² "Dijo Bergson un día a los filósofos reunidos en Bolonia que la doctrina de cada filósofo podía reducirse, en lo que tenía de personal originalidad, a una intuición matriz, y ésta revelarse en unas pocas palabras, en una sola palabra. Busquen este trabajo de Bergson mis amigos: ¡cuántas luces hallarán en él! La estructura del pensamiento de *Azorín* puede dibujarse entera, en torno a un centro único, que se cifrará en su intuición característica de la *sensibilidad*, en su ponderación del valor de ella".

¹³ On "figurative thinking", see Aranguren, 85, and Jorge M. Ayala, "Filosofía y concepción de la historia en Eugenio d'Ors", in *Actas del III Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía Española*, 368.

¹⁴ Eugenio d'Ors, *Glosas. Páginas del Glosari de Xenius (1906-1917)*, tr. Alfonso Maseras, Madrid, 1920, 284.

Good sense, regarded by him as a civic virtue, displays two sides: on the one hand, an active attitude of intelligence; on the other hand, the self-defiance of intelligence which recognizes its sub-intellectual roots.¹⁵ Ors, though, eschews Bergson's anti-intellectualism. *Sagesse* he interprets as a balance of intellectual and moral forces, in which empirical elements, retained and not rejected, become integrated within orderly intellectual patterns. Ors's word *Seny* amounts to *noûs*, "mind" or "intelligence" in pre-Aristotelian Greek, a concept encompassing reason, logic, good taste, balance, and sensitivity. *Seny*, so understood, constitutes, the central notion of Ors's philosophy of man the worker and player. *Seny* incorporates Bergsonian intuition of concrete reality into modern discursive reason (*FHTJ*, 121). As between intuition and reason, Ors holds the latter superior within the broader framework of *Seny*. This preference for rationality explains certain propensities of Ors's thinking which bear almost a nominalistic Berkeleyan stamp: 1.) a will to philosophical transparency which reaches the point of viewing philosophy as a system of concrete ideas; 2.) a mistrust (though not a denial) of the ineffable, of change, of infinity; 3.) a love of finite, discrete, discontinuous realities perceived as such by intelligence, as opposed to the continuity of *durée réelle* pursued by Bergson's intuition.

Bergson compares matter, as conceived by Berkeley, to a fine, transparent film placed between man and God. Transparent as long as philosophers leave it alone, it grows opaque when they interpose words like substance, force, and *res extensa* between man and God (1356). Ors, though not averse to the use of concepts like substance and force, like Berkeley appreciates transparency, the virtue of the lens which "admits, without opaque interference, the

¹⁵ Henri Bergson, "Le Bon sens et les études classiques" (1985), in *Mélanges*, Paris, 1972, 360.

light-beam which every understanding can cast upon a matter" (1927, *NG*, II, 47).¹⁶ Ors appreciates intelligence which displays its knowledge without demonstrating it. This facility he calls the "genius of pure presentation", comparable to light. Putting forth the evidence ("evidencia") evinces clairvoyance ("videncia") (1927, *NG*, II, 162). Ors struggles to illumine his countrymen, world, and era, and calls such strife the *Heliomaquia*, the solar struggle.¹⁷ In this campaign, he exalts superficiality at the expense of depth. Just as Berkeley, paraphrased by Bergson, denies that matter has an inside, an underside, or a content, so Ors insists that "the eternity of things is precisely their form, not that inner ghost which our foolhardiness causes us to judge worthy of the name of spirit".¹⁸ Bergson's Berkeley calls material objects "ideas", whose being is exhausted in their appearance; if those "ideas" hold nothing within themselves, they can yield no general abstractions. Each concrete "idea" provides at most a mere "word" ("mot": Bergson, 1354). Analogously, Ors asserts, "In the beginning was Appearance".¹⁹ He equates ideas to the words meant to express them, and he views knowing as tantamount to speaking (1920, *NG*, I, 348-9).

Since knowledge requires articulation, Ors denounces Eastern mystics who flee as enemies of light to solitude and lack of understanding. He deems understanding man's first duty, and being understood his second. Everything beyond understanding, as Ors puts it, poisons, while individuals abstaining from dialogue poi-

¹⁶ "...deja pasar, sin intromisión opaca, el rayo de luz que cada entendimiento puede proyectar sobre una materia".

¹⁷ Luis Jiménez Moreno, "El saber estético-lúdico de Eugenio d'Ors", in *Actas del III Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía Española*, 383.

¹⁸ "...la eternidad de las cosas es su forma precisamente, no aquel fantasma interior a quien temerariamente hemos adjudicado el nombre de espíritu".

¹⁹ "En un principio era la Apariencia". Here Ors plays on the word "principio", meaning "beginning" and "first principle" (as in the expression "in principle").

son themselves (1920, *NG*, I, 236). We recall the poisonous Oriental flute attributed by Ors to Bergson, avowed anti-intellectualist. In *L'Évolution créatrice* intelligence is seen as an organ for mastering matter, an organ adapted to the form of matter itself. Language, allowing intelligence to broaden its domain, has the sole purpose of denoting things. Only the mobility of words allows intelligence to reify beings which are not things, but which await verbalization to pass from the shadows to the light. Even when not operating on matter, intelligence behaves as if it were, applying to whatever it touches forms proper to inorganic material. This application receives expression in the terms "clarity" and "distinctness". Intelligence, therefore, in Bergson's opinion, in order to form a "clear" and "distinct" conception of itself, should view itself as discontinuous, like inorganic matter. Concepts, like solids in space, lie fixed outside one another, forming in their totality an "intelligible world". However, when intelligence turns toward life, it shows astonishment at what Bergson calls the true continuity, the real mobility, and the reciprocal interpenetration characterizing creative evolution (630-32). Nevertheless, given the mobility of life, Ors sees philosophy as a motion-picture film onto which this movement is projected. The film moves, but is in itself a series of static scenes. The philosopher, like a good cinematographer, aspires to capture the portion of eternity lying in every moment (*FHTJ*, 109-10). Hence, without renouncing existence in all its instability, Ors the philosopher stresses the value of essence. As to the claim that intelligence cannot approach, as intuition can, the infinitude of life, Ors has a ready reply in his doctrine of limitation. He recognizes the need to aim without pause toward the infinite. But he visualizes infinity contained by limits, like Dionysus in the winecup. Acknowledgement of self-limitations strikes him as a sign of manhood and maturity; susceptibility to the temptation of every new possibility, as a symptom of puerility.

Besides, philosophy has enough to do in seeking knowledge of what seem to be the simplest phenomena of life. Intelligence, rationality, and memory necessarily appear in every act of seeing or tasting an orange. Ors finds it impossible to see the fruit without remembering oranges beforehand, or to taste it without defining its shape.²⁰

Underlying Ors's taste for the finite and discreet is a patriotic motive, which has impelled him in his doctoral dissertation to vindicate intelligence in the face of Bergsonian intuition. Ors, it should be underscored, does not aim to banish intuition from philosophy, but to consign it to a lower rank with relation to intelligence. Hoping to bring "scientism" to Barcelona, he employs Minkowsky's ideas on relativity to refute Bergson in his thesis. The refutation has to do with the aporiae of Zeno de Elea, which Bergson approaches from the standpoint of his intuitionism and Ors from the perspective of his intellectualism. Zeno denies the existence of movement: an arrow stays at rest at every instant of its flight and therefore during its whole trajectory. In *L'Évolution créatrice*, Bergson replies that one movement alone is a totality, which can be a movement between two points of time in which the object is at rest. If other moments of rest are intercalated between those two, the movement ceases to be singular and divides into a plurality of movements. Intelligence operates, as Bergson puts it, with a cinematographic method ("méthode cinématographique", 754). It apprehends the reality of movement as a series of static pictures. But intuition, by inserting itself with sympathy into the interior of the movement, perceives it as the becoming, the *devenir*, which it is. Hence Bergson rejects the Greek preference for the word and the concept vis-à-vis the movement of life. On the other hand, Ors, guided by Minkowsky, argues against

²⁰ *Glosas*, 218-20.

Bergson that we may unite the notions of space and time instead of keeping them separate. Let us define an event as an intersection between an instant of time and a point in space. We may afterwards conceive a series of events as a line comprised of many intersections of temporal and spatial points. Each intersection possesses its own reality, like each note of a symphony written on paper in a series. We thereby join the Greeks in affirming the discontinuity of reality. We rationalize what was previously irrational. We synthesize the ideal and the concrete. Finally, we subordinate intuition to intelligence (Aranguren, 251). Despite this new order of preferences, Ors owes his conceptions of intelligence and intuition to Bergson.

This debt to Bergson for the idea of intelligence gives Ors's philosophy its main characteristic as pinpointed by Aranguren: it is an ethics, a philosophy of *praxis* (118). We can well understand Ors's concentration on practical life if we recall that he styles himself as an intellectualist. Intelligence, we remember, consists for Bergson of a means for transferring matter into an instrument for human action. He dreams of a "humanité complète et parfaite", with fully developed intelligence and intuition, but laments that mankind's concentration on mastery of matter has sacrificed intuition to intelligence (721-22). Hence he attempts to reaffirm the rights of intuition, while his Catalan student does the reverse, reasserting the supremacy of intelligence. Recognizing with Bergson the incongruity between reality and the rational image of the real, Ors nonetheless calls this image the best part of reality for a practical reason: without it, reality would poison man, absorb him. Therefore, like the Catholic Church in the face of certain demoniacal phenomena, Ors damns irrationality as venomous while using intelligence to increase life (*FHTJ*, 49-50). As a result he denies the adage *primum vivere, deinde philosophari*, because his doctrine negates the adverbs *primum* and *deinde*: philosophizing

takes place at the moment of living and seeks the eternal element of that moment (*FHTJ*, 44). This practical outlook affects his own philosophy in its point of departure — the complete man, who works and plays — and in its loftiest consequence — mysticism; in both instances, moreover, Ors continues his dialogue with the intuitionist Bergson.

Asking at what date man appears on earth, Bergson responds that this event takes place with the manufacture of the first utensils or arms. Prehistory would seem to indicate that man's constant characteristic consists not of knowing, but of making. Bergson would substitute the label *Homo faber* for the usual one of *Homo sapiens*, reflecting an excess of pride; for intelligence, seen in its primigenious form, is nothing but the faculty for making utensils (611, 613). However, the intellectualist Ors prefers to view man not at his beginnings, but at the fullness of his being, endowed with *Seny*. As Luis Jiménez Moreno points out (371), Ors sees the complete man as *Homo sapiens*, diversified into *Homo faber* and *Homo ludens*. He can respond to his teacher Bergson that intelligence, science, may well be addressed toward action. But action bifurcates into work and play (*FHTJ*, 137). In Ors, *sapere*, *fabricare*, and *ludere*, notes Aranguren (213), are three possible forms of creating, of mastering nature, of acquiring freedom. In the endeavor to arrive at the essence of freedom, Ors chooses an example from the realm of work, the experience of the woodsman in felling a tree. Undoubtedly he writes inspired by Bergson's view of freedom as the relationship of a concrete ego to an act it accomplishes. In the same context, moreover, the author of the *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* remarks that the relationship of outer causality is merely mathematical, unlike the relationship of psychic force to the act it produces (143). Hence Ors conceives the idea of determining where, in the woodsman's act, outer causality ends and ego, i.e., freedom, begins. His analysis re-

presents a self-conscious application of intelligence to a problem. From Bergson, he has learned that intelligence reifies whatever it touches. Therefore, at the point that reification can go no further, there lies freedom, selfhood. Neither the woodsman's hatchet, nor his hand, his arm, his energy, talent, wishes, sentiments, nor even his intelligence itself are the woodsman's being: they are things, situated outside his ego and even capable of hindering his effort under certain circumstances. Like Bergson, who finds the free act undefinable — to define this portion of *durée réelle* would be tantamount to identifying it with a symbol of itself (144) —, Ors regards freedom as something irreducible to a psychological or a logical definition. It is enough to call it freedom (*FHTJ*, 110-13) and to determine how to attain it in practical life. This is the most significant lesson which *Seny* can offer mankind.

Seny, however, transcends mere intelligence in the Bergsonian sense. That ampler faculty of mind instructs Ors that man can achieve absolute freedom only by rising above rationality, even above consciousness itself. Freedom achieves a relationship with itself, to borrow Ors's words,²¹ through a religious act. To understand the nature of this act, which leads us to the mystic aspect of Ors's intellectualism, we must return to Bergson's intuitionism for the key. In intuiting the *durée réelle* of all life, the author of *L'Évolution créatrice* perceives reality in the form of a great impulse or *élan vital*. Every organism, contemplated from this standpoint, according to J. Theau (429), appears to be a segment detached from the current of primal vitality, which endlessly produces individuals and from time to time new species. Within each individual lies a portion of *élan vital*, with its need to differentiate new indivi-

²¹ "How, then, can freedom attain a relationship with itself? By means of a religious act" ("¿Cómo, pues, puede la libertad relacionarse consigo misma? Por medio de un acto religioso"). Quoted from *Una hora con Eugenio d'Ors* in Aranguren, 214.

duals and with its concurrent tendency to gather individuals into common species. For this reason in every living being a tendency toward individualization coexists with a tendency toward sociability. Hence Ors distinguishes plants, animals, and men by contrasting the degrees to which those two tendencies appear in each of the three. Plants lack virtually all individuality; animals present individuals coexisting with their species but ruled by the species; mankind displays individuals who rule over their species and who defy and attempts to substitute other individuals for them. Still, by extending his reason to a sphere above reason, Ors can conceive of an individual so singular that it lacks a species. This archetype Ors calls an Angel, comprising in itself all possibilities of the human species. Union with his Angel, writes Aranguren (156, 215), defines the mystic aspiration of Eugeni d'Ors.

Ors's critics, to our knowledge, have never recognized that he here follows the example of Bergson. However, he gives Bergson's mysticism, based on intuition, a different sign, drawn, as we could have predicted, from the intelligence. In *La Pensée et le mouvant* (1303), Bergson draws a contrast between two styles of thinking, one human ("humain"), the other almost divine ("quasi divin"). The first entails the use of concepts; the second, intuition. The human mode of thought accepts its place in social intellectual habits. It makes use of preexisting ideas as if they were any kind of instruments provided by the community. But Bergson evidently prefers the other mental style, involving reimmersion in the *élan vital* through direct intuition of that force, which generates the societies capable of creating the concepts useful to mere intelligence. Intuition, in Bergson's opinion, serves the purpose of exorcizing philosophical ghosts, insoluble problems, like that of the origin of being, which uselessly haunt the metaphysician. Now, the Catholic Eugeni d'Ors, like his teacher, views himself as a philosophical exorcist. But the demonic ghosts on which he operates

are often the problems posed by Bergson's philosophy itself. On the last page of his doctoral thesis, he affirms,

We have struggled, we are struggling, and we want to keep struggling against the ghost of *mystery*, against the ghost of *inner life*, against the ghost of the *unconscious*, against the ghost of the *ineffable*. The present thesis is an episode of the parallel battle against *infinitism* and *continuity* (Aranguren, 257)²²

Yet, in both the cases of Bergson and Ors, the two extremes meet: neither Bergson, despite his protest noted above, desires to exorcize the ghost of the origin of being, nor Ors the problem of mystery, of the infinite.

Otherwise, ecstasy could hardly have any place in the intuitionism of Bergson and in the *Heliomaquia* of Ors. In *Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion*, Bergson describes a mystic experience in which the writer (Bergson himself?) comes to discover the first principle of life, the *élan vital*. The writer rises from the intellectual and social plane to a point in his own soul which emanates an imperative to create, a need felt in all its fullness only once in a lifetime. This impulse arises from depth of objects themselves. Verbalization of such an experience requires great effort, with failure probable (1191). As between animal instinct, intuition, and intelligence, Bergson finds intuition the faculty capable of illumining the roots of man's being and the principle of life in general. The mystic's soul, Bergson remarks, may well contain the same illumination (1187). Ors, however, distinguishes various forms of mysticism, the type which discovers the center and sym-

²² "Hemos luchado, luchamos y queremos luchar aún contra el fantasma del misterio, contra el fantasma de la *vida interior*, contra el fantasma de lo *inconsciente*, contra el fantasma de lo *inefable*. La presente tesis es un episodio de la batalla paralela contra el *infinitismo* y la *continuidad*".

bol of mystery, emotion, and ineffability in darkness, and the kind which encounters all this in the sun. Mystics of sunshine may, if they abdicate their intelligence, let themselves be dazzled by the rays; but the application of intelligence can convert the sun into an "instrument of illumination" (1921, *NG*, I, 541). Here appears a new variation on the Bergsonian theme of intelligence as a faculty for reifying the universe. The reification, though, acquires in Ors the nuance of creativity which illumination through intuition acquired in Bergson. But the philosopher of *Seny* lays greater emphasis than Bergson on active participation in the creation. Mystic contemplation for the Catholic monk or the Catholic philosopher, in Ors's opinion, requires effort. The contemplator must attain to the concrete figure of the object of his devotion by separating that object from everything else. This "figurative" reckoning places contemplation in the realm of "poetics", the science of creation (1945, *NOG*, 533-34). The object contemplated becomes a work of art. At the same time, the contemplator experiences ecstasy. Whereas in Bergson intuition transports the writer to the source of the temporal flow, in Ors intelligence lifts him above time to the eternal world of Platonic Ideas, of archetypes. Still, the discursive tides of Bergson's intuitions never ebb in his prose; while, as Aranguren suggests (152), Ors's discontinuous glosses are capable of fragmenting into mystic babbling like the following:

Fatality sought to make me a land-dwelling mammal, nothing more. I want to be a fish, I want to be a bird. I yearn for the air and the sea for myself as well. Correction. There might still be a more arbitrary, loftier sport... That of becoming rejuvenated (1921, *NG*, I, 510-11)²³

²³ "La fatalidad pretendía hacer de mí un mamífero terráqueo no más. Yo quiero ser pez, yo quiero ser ave. Anheló, también para mí, el aire y el mar. Rectifico. Habría aún algún deporte más arbitrario, más elevado... El de rejuvenecerse".

Hovering above time like a bird, immersed like a fish in a sea of light, united with his Angel, Ors feels eternally young.

In the foregoing study, we have observed that too many likenesses exist between the mental styles of Bergson and Ors to make one simply the refutation or reverse of the other. We have pointed out the mixture of fascination and fear which Bergson's intuitionism inspires in Ors; the parallels in their philosophical goals and methods; the significant rôles played by intuition and intelligence in the philosophies of both; Bergson's influence on Ors's conception of both these faculties; Bergson's presence in Ors's point of departure, the complete man who works and plays; and the mysticism crowning the thought of both philosophers. Without a doubt the comparison between Bergson and Ors should be pursued in all the cognitive fields they share. As long as various of Ors's early major discursive works remain unpublished in Barcelona, an important key to his published production lies in comparative analyses with Bergson's. Here, we have merely taken a first step toward indicating a research route for others better informed about Ors, whether they choose an intuitionist's path like Bergson's or whether they prefer, as we do, to accompany Ors himself on the biways of intellectualism.

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